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INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE REAGAN YEARS:
HOW MUCH OF AN OUTLIER?
by
JOHN KING GAMBLE, JR.
INTRODUCTION
Academics with an interest in international law tend to believe that policy
makers pay far too little attention to that law. If we academics had our druthers,
secretaries of state would have Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice prominently displayed on their office walls. Presidents' state of the union
addresses would be replete with references to international law, showing both an
understanding of, and respect for, the law. This is an unrealistic goal, at least with
most administrations in most periods of American history. Presidents and secretar-
ies of state often feel that international law is an annoyance that hobbles their pursuit
of the national interest. No doubt adherence to international law is not a prime
concern of most presidents.
But is there reason to believe that the attitude and behavior of the Reagan
administration towards international law have been unusually hostile? That funda-
mental question will be addressed in several ways. First, one component of President
Reagan's foreign policy, aid for the Nicaraguan Contras, will be discussed in some
detail. That particular policy has produced perhaps the most sharply drawn,
sustained conflict with international law. Second, a much briefer account will be
provided about two other Reagan administration encounters with international law.
Finally, an attempt will be made to provide some historical perspective to the 1981-
1988 period.
Any discussion of presidential inclination towards international law must not
confuse the wisdom and legality. For example, many scholars of international law
and international organizations questioned the wisdom of the United States decision
to withdraw from UNESCO. Many felt that it would have been preferable to work
from within to try to reform the organization. Secretary of State Schultz's letter to
Director-General M'Bow reads:
The purpose of this letter is to notify you within the terms of Article Two
Paragraph Six of the Constitution that my Government will withdraw
from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
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tion effective December 31, 1984.'
There can be no doubt that the U.S. withdrawal adhered to the letter and spirit of
applicable treaty law. Perhaps the action was unwise. Did it violate international
law? Absolutely not.
A recurring problem with attempts to assess the international legal propriety
of policies is the importance of the national interest involved. When evaluating the
role of international law, it may be unrealistic and confusing to lump all foreign
policy behavior together. Clearly, if a country finds itself facing an international
crisis, international law's role will be diminished doubly. Changes in national
behavior towards conformity with international law will be resisted in such crises
because the stakes are too high. Further, when confronted with a crisis, the most that
can be expected is a careful balancing of the expedient against the legal, with the
former giving way only a little to the latter. Striking that balance requires time, and
time often is the scarcest commodity during a crisis.
The problems attendant with expecting international law to play a role in
political crises have been dealt with fairly extensively in the literature.2 Professor
Henkin's contribution is cited often.3 Although Henkin clearly believes his ap-
proach should apply at both the crisis and regular levels, his analysis and examples
point mostly toward sub-crisis behavior. Scheinman and Wilkinson and their col-
laborators also find a very small role for international law in crisis situations. For
example, in discussing the 1948 Berlin Blockade, international law:
... serve[d] as a means to probe the other side's commitment [as a
substitute for force], and by obscuring the underlying political confron-
tation in the jargon of the law, they blanket the volatility which
characterizes the Berlin situation.4
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is often cited in explaining the role [or lack of
it] for international law. Gerberding is harsh in his conclusions, believing that the
crisis produced "some brilliant statesmanship which was motivated by... political
and strategic considerations, not by amorphous and largely irrelevant international
legal norms." 5 The individual elements of Gerberding's analysis paint a different
picture. Legal considerations bore heavily on the descriptor "quarantine" rather
than "blockade.'"6 Gerberding makes much of the fact that the legality of the actions
Letter, dated 28 December 1983, from Secretary of State George P. Schultz, 84 DEP'T ST. BULL. 41 (Feb.,
1984).
2 Although now dated, L. SCHEINMAN & D. WILKINSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICAL CRISIS: AN
ANALYTIC CASEBOOK (1968), is one of the best examples.
L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (1968).
Scheinman, The Berlin Blockade, in SCH-EINMAN & WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 40.
Gerberding, International Law and the Cuban Missile Crisis, in SCHEINMAN & WILKINSON, supra note 2, at
210.
6 Id. at 181.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:3
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 23 [1990], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol23/iss3/2
Spring, 1990] INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE REAGAN YEARS 353
was "worked out ... carefilly worked out, after the basic decisions were made." 7
Probably international law's role was minimal. But it did make some contribution
and, after all, this was perhaps the most acute superpower crisis of the post-World
War II era!
FRONTAL ATTACK: AID TO THE NICARAGUAN CONTRAS AND
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
No doubt the most conspicuous clashes between Reagan administration policy
and international law center around U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan contras. The nature
and extent of U.S. violations of international law became clearer and much less
refutable because the International Court of Justice dealt with the matter. So far there
have been four pronouncements from the Court:
(1) Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures, Decision [hereinafter Provisional Decision]
dated 10 May 1984,8 Order [hereinafter Provisional Order] dated 14
May 1984.9
(2) Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Declaration of Intervention of
the Republic of El Salvador [hereinafter Salvadoran Declaration],
dated 4 October 1984.10
(3) Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Jurisdiction of the Court and
Admissibility of the Application [hereinafter Jurisdiction], dated 26
November 1984.11
(4) Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Judgment on the Merits
[hereinafter Merits], dated 27 June 1986.2
Id. at 201.
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1984 I.C.J. 169-207 (Order of 10 May 1984).
' Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States), 1984 I.C.J. 209-10 (Order of 14 May 1984).
1o Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States), Declaration of Intervention of the Republic of El Salvador, 1984 I.C.J. 215-44 (Order of 4 October
1984).
" Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States), Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application, 1984 I.C.J. 392-637 (dated 26
November 1984).
2 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States), Judgment on the Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14-546 (dated 27 June 1986).
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There might be yet another element of the proceedings when the Court
determine damages. 3 These decisions are lengthy and complex. No doubt they will
occupy many international legal scholars for years, perhaps decades to come. The
Merits decision of June 1986 contains seven separate opinions and three dissenting
opinions in addition to the 130 page judgment on the merits. 4 It is, however,
necessary to provide a brief summary of each decision.
Provisional decision
The first phase of the case dealt with Nicaragua's request for provisional
measures to bring relief from illegal U.S. activities consisting of:
recruiting, training, arming, equipping, financing, supplying and other-
wise encouraging, supporting, aiding, and directing military and para-
military actions in and against Nicaragua, has violated and is violating
its express Charter and treaty obligations to Nicaragua.
Even before the proceedings began, the United States tried to deny the Court's
jurisdiction. The first such attempt, a letter to UN Secretary-General Perez de
Cuellar modifying the terms under which the U.S. accepted the Optional Clause of
the ICJ Charter,'6 will be discussed later.
Throughout this phase, the Court walked a delicate line. It found that it need
not "satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case" in order to reach
a decision on provisional measures. 7 The U.S. argued strenuously against such
measures believing they "could irreparably prejudice the interests of a number of
states and seriously interfere with the negotiations being conducted pursuant to the
Contadora process."' 8 The U.S. argument was not accepted. The Court held unani-
mously that:
The United States of America should immediately cease and refrain
from any action restricting, blocking or endangering access to or from
Nicaraguan ports, and, in particular, the laying of mines. 9
Another part of the decision, a far more general prohibition of many kinds of illegal
activities, fell just short of unanimity.20
13 Leigh, Judicial Decision, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 206 (1987).
'a Merits, supra note 12.
'5 Provisional Decision, supra note 8, at 5.
16 Letter dated 6 April 1984 from Secretary of State Schultz to UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar,
reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 670 (1984).
17 Provisional Decision, supra note 8, at 14.
l8 Id. at 18.
'9 Id. at 22.
O Id.
[Vol. 23:3AKRON LAw REVIEW
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Salvadoran Declaration
The second phase of Court actions concerns the appeal by El Salvador that it
be permitted to participate in the proceedings. El Salvador's agent to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice stated in a letter dated 15 August 1984:
The Government of Nicaragua, in a malicious and improper fashion, has
assured the Court that El Salvador does not consider itself the object of
armed attack from Nicaragua. In view of these false allegations, the
Republic of El Salvador has no alternative but to participate in the
proceedings resulting from Nicaragua's Application of 9 April 1984.2!
The Court was unconvinced and "decided by a vote of nine to six" not to hold a
hearing on the Declaration of Intervention of the Republic of El Salvador.' '22 By a
vote of fourteen to one [Schwebel], the Court held that the declaration was
"inadmissible inasmuch as it relates to the current phase of the proceedings brought
by Nicaragua against the United States.' '23
Jurisdiction
The next chapter in this saga concerned the crucial questions of jurisdiction
and admissibility. This stage of proceedings is always critical, but, in this instance,
since the U.S. was to decline to participate in the Merits phase, it assumed added
significance. The strongest argument against jurisdiction centered around whether
Nicaragua had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36.
Beginning in September, 1929, Nicaragua took definitive steps to indicate it wished
to be bound by the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International
Justice. 24 On 24 September 1929, it declared, "[o]n behalf of the Republic of Nica-
ragua, I recognize as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice.' '25 The intent was clear, but no instrument of ratification was ever
received by the League of Nations in Geneva.26 In the face of strenuous objection
from the United States, the Court found:
the constant acquiescence of Nicaragua in affirmations, to be found in
the United Nations and other publications, of its position as bound by the
optional clause, constitutes a valid manifestation of its intent to recog-
nize the jurisdiction of the Court.27
21 Letter pursuant to Salvadoran Declaration, supra note 10, reprinted in 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 38
(1985).
22 id. at 44.
23 Id.
24 Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 399.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 441.
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When it came to discussing admissibility, the U.S. advanced many arguments, some
of which will be dealt with in the subsequent section. The most formidable point
made by the U.S. concerned the idea that "indispensable parties" must be permitted
to join in the proceedings. The U.S. did not prevail:
There is no doubt that in appropriate circumstances the Court will
decline.., to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it where the legal
interests of a State not party to the proceedings 'would... be affected
by a decision.... Where however claims of a legal nature are made by
an Applicant against a Respondent in proceedings before the Court, and
made the subject of submissions, the Court has in principle merely to
decide upon those submissions .... There is no trace, either in the Statute
or in the practice of international tribunals, of an 'indispensable parties'
rule of the kind argued for by the United States. 8
The final judgment on Jurisdiction was made relative to four separate points:
* Jurisdiction under Article 36 [eleven votes to five];
* Jurisdiction under the 1956 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation [fourteen votes to two];
* Jurisdiction to entertain the case [fifteen votes to one];
* the Application is admissible [unanimously]. 29
The United States had raised a number of arguments which held sway with some
judges, but it lost all the major battles and the war itself.
Merits
The final [Merits] phase of the case was somewhat anticlimatic, since the U.S.
refused to participate. It is ironic that in spite of its absence from the proceedings,
the U.S. position was upheld on one important issue, i.e., the applicability of the
Vandenberg Reservation, so that neither the UN nor the O.A.S. Charters could be
used against the United States:
At the same time, it conclude[d] that in the particular circumstances of
this case, it is impossible to say that a ruling on the alleged breach by the
United States of Article 18 of the Organization of American States
Charter would not affect El Salvador.... Accordingly, the Court, which
under Article 53 of the Statute has to be 'satisfied' that it has jurisdiction
28 Id. at 431.
29 Id. at 442.
[Vol. 23:3
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to decide each of the claims it is asked to uphold, concluded that the
jurisdiction conferred upon it by the United States declaration of
acceptance of jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute
does not permit the Court to entertain these claims. It should however
be recalled that, as will be explained further below, the effect of the
reservation in question is confined to barring the applicability of the
United Nations Charter and Organization of American States Charter as
multilateral treaty law, and has no further impact on the sources of
international law which Article 38 of the Statute requires the Court to
apply.3"
As the last sentence of the previous statement indicates, the U.S. succeeded in
avoiding jurisdiction under two important multilateral treaties, but the matter of
jurisdiction under bilateral treaties and customary law remained and would prove
decisive. The Court was meticulous in examining the issue of the wider applicability
of the U.S. multilateral treaty reservation. It was careful to try to understand the
United States' view, which had been expressed during the Jurisdiction phase:
Thus the United States apparently takes the view that the existence of
principles in the United Nations Charter precludes the possibility that
similar rules might exist independently in customary international law.
... The Court... finds that Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful
on the basis that there is a "natural" or " inherent" right of self defense
and it is hard to see how this can be other than a customary nature, even
if its present content has been confirmed and influenced by the Char-
ter.3
Ultimately the Court decided that it had jurisdiction "based upon customary inter-
national law. "2 Subsequently the Court reaffirmed its jurisdiction based on the
1956 bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation.33 Together, cus-
tomary law and the 1956 treaty provided sufficient grounds for the Court to decide
the merits of the case. That the Court did with diligence and thoroughness noting
inter alia:
1. when, where and by whom mines were struck;3 4
2. CIA reports to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence;3
5
3. U.S. presidential news conferences;36
3 Merits, supra note 12, at 38.
31 Id. at 93-94.
32 Id. at 97.
33 Id. at 115.
34 Id. at 45-46.
31 Id. at 47.
36 Id. at 49.
Spring, 1990]
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4. Congressional appropriations for the contras.37
In conclusion the Court found:
The financial support given by the Government of the United States to
the military and paramilitary activities of the contras in Nicaragua is a
fully established fact. The legislative and executive bodies of the re-
spondent State have, moreover, subsequent to the controversy which
has been sparked off in the United States, openly admitted the nature,
volume and frequency of this support.3"
The battle was essentially over at this point, and a judgment favorable to Nicaragua
was inevitable.
The principal decision by the Court contains a number of twelve to three
opinions with Judges Oda (Japan), Jennings (U.K.) and Schwebel (U.S.A.) usually
in the minority. First, the Court rejected the U.S. assertions of collective self de-
fense.39 Second, the "training, arming, equipping, financing, and supplying the
contra forces" by the United States was found to be a "breach of its obligation under
customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another State. "I Third,
the enumerated attacks on Nicaraguan territory were a breach of the customary law
standard "not to use force against another State." 4 Fourth, the U.S. must "make
reparation.., for all injury caused to Nicaragua" by the aforementioned violations
of customary international law.42
Several other portions of the decision were made on fourteen to one votes. All
judges save Schwebel found the U.S. in violation of the 1956 bilateral treaty.43 Judge
Oda was the only dissenter on the finding that the U.S. violated customary
international law by failing to publicize the "existence and locations" of the mines."
Sadly, but not unexpectedly, the only point on which the Court was unanimous was
the obligation of both parties "to seek a solution to their disputes by peaceful means
in accordance with international law." 45
This very quick "tour" of the Merits phase does not do justice to the
importance and complexity of the decisions reached. The main judgment, along with
separate opinions by Judges Nagenda Singh, Lachs, Ruda, Elias, Ago, Sette-
Camara, and Ni, and dissenting opinions by Judges Oda, Jennings, and Schwebel,
31 Id. at 57-58.
38 Id. at 61.
39 Id. at 146.
4 Id.
41 Id. at 147.
42 Id. at 149.
41 Id. at 147.
4 Id. at 148.
41 Id. at 149.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:3
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will be standard fare in many textbooks long after Nicaragua and the U.S. have
resumed peaceful relations. The unusual use of customary international law by the
Court will occupy scholars for decades.
This brief summary is sufficient background for a discussion of the matter of
the U.S. posture towards international law as manifested in various responses to this
case. One would expect any government, when participating in adversarial proceed-
ings before the International Court of Justice, to adopt a number of arguments and
tactics to try to advance its cause. Some of these may show a nonchalance or even
a disrespect for international law. For example, the U.S. contention that its
Vandenberg reservation applied to all treaties stretches the point considerably.46
Many academics have argued that the U.S. decision to withdraw acceptance of the
Optional Clause was unwise, but the legal right to do so is unquestionable, provided
adequate notice is given. Thus, the focus of this section will be those actions taken
and attitudes expressed by the United States that seem to be beyond the pale of usual
U.S. respect for international law and the institution of the Court. Three things seem
to stand out -- each will be discussed in turn.
Attempt to modify the "Optional Clause"
Nicaragua filed its application with the International Court of Justice on April
9, 1984. 47 Three days earlier, surely because of receiving advanced warning that the
Government of Nicaragua was applying to the ICJ, Secretary of State Schultz, in a
letter to Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, attempted to modify U.S. acceptance
of the Optional Clause:
the aforesaid Declaration shall not apply to disputes with any Central
American state or arising out of or related to events in Central America,
any of which disputes shall be settled in such manner as the parties to
them may agree .... Not withstanding the terms of the aforesaid
Declaration, this proviso shall take effect immediately and shall remain
in force for two years, so as to foster the continuing regional dispute
settlement process.48
This is nice law if you can get it, but the U.S. could not. The Court's opinion about
this immediate, selective, two-year suspension of the Optional Clause could hardly
have been clearer:
The most important question relating to the effect of the 1984 notifica-
tion is whether the United States was free to disregard the clause of six
month's notice which, freely and by its own choice, it had appended to
46 Briggs, The International Court of Justice Lives Up To Its Name, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 80 (1987).
47 Leigh, Judicial Decisions, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 442 (1985).
" Schultz letter, supra note 16.
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its 1946 Declaration. In so doing the United States entered into an
obligation which is binding upon it vis-a-vis other States parties to the
Optional-Clause system. Although the United States retained the right
to modify the contents of the 1946 Declaration or to terminate it, a power
which is inherent in any unilateral act of a State, it has, nevertheless,
assumed an inescapable obligation towards other States accepting the
Optional Clause, by stating formally and solemnly that any such change
should take effect only after six months have elapsed as from the date
of notice.49
The Reagan administration would argue, not without some justification, that
the six month requirement unacceptably hobbles its pursuit of the national interest.
If this were the perception, especially in light of a deteriorating Central American
situation, the U.S. should have withdrawn acceptance of the Optional Clause earlier.
In fact, one could argue that a principal task of the State Department should be to
provide timely advice so that U.S. foreign policy goals can be pursued within a
framework of acceptable standards of international law. In Professor Franck's
words, the U.S. cannot "dismiss" the Court's action "as mere window dressing for
a hanging party. "50 Concocting such an argument may be an acceptable legal tactic,
but it is naive to expect the Court to buy it "particularly in view of the rather osten-
tatiously self-imposed 6-month notice requirement which sought to demonstrate
U.S. resolve never to employ so unworthy an evasion." 5
Refusal to participate in the Merits phase after participating fully
in the Jurisdiction/Admissibility phase
Unfortunately, many recent ICJ decisions have been reached without the
participation of one of the parties. This occurred in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case,5 2
in the Nuclear Tests case,53 in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelfcase,5 4 and in the Iran
Hostages case.5" In all of these, the decision not to appear applied to all phases of
the case making them fundamentally different from Nicaragua v. United States
where the U.S. participated in the Jurisdiction phase and withdrew for the Merits
portion.
The Court must follow its own Statute when dealing with the nonappearance
of a party:
1. Whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or
4 Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 419.
50 Franck, Icy.Day at the ICJ, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 383 (1985).
5 Id.
52 1974 I.C.J. 3.
1974 I.C.J. 253.
1978 I.C.J. 3.
11 Case Concerning U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:3
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fails to defend its case, the other party may call upon the Court to
decide in favor of its claim.
2. The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it has
jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36 and 37, but also that the
claim is well founded in fact.56
The United States' position seems to be that half an appearance is better than
none.57 There are good reasons to believe otherwise. Given the fact that the U.S. was
still bound by the Optional Clause, it would have seemed more respectful of
international law if the U.S. had refused participation in all phases of the case. As
it stands now, the U.S. action has a distinct "I'll play as long as I can win" air about
it. The difficulty is compounded by the asymmetry created when one party does not
participate. Judge Jennings described the problem in this way:
the United States can hardly complain about the inevitable conse-
quences of its failure to plead during the substantive phase of the case.
It is true that a great volume of material about the facts was provided to
the Court by the United States during the earlier phases of the case. Yet
a party which fails at the material stage to appear and expound and
explain even the material that it has already provided inevitably preju-
dices the appreciation and assessment of the facts of the case. 8
To anyone trying to assess the U.S. withdrawal in legal terms, there is precious
little to go on in terms of official government statements. The State Department did
prepare "Observations" about the Jurisdiction phase, but these say nothing about
the legal bases of the U.S. withdrawal.59 The U.S. even went so far as to suggest that
withdrawing served the cause of law:
On January 18 of this year we announced that the United States would
no longer participate in the proceedings instituted against it by Nicara-
gua in the International Court of Justice. Neither the rule of law nor the
search for peace in Central America would have been served by further
United States participation. The objectives of the ICJ to which we
subscribe -- the peaceful adjudication of international disputes -- were
being subverted by the effort of Nicaragua and its Cuban and Soviet
sponsors to use the Court as a political weapon. 6°
The point is that the U.S., like almost all countries, must interpret international
. I.C.J. Statute, Art. 53.
. See Observations on the International Court of Justice's Nov. 26, 1984, Judgment, reprinted in 79 AM.
J. l1m'L L. 423-30 (1985) [hereinafter Observations].
" Quoted in Highet, Evidence, the Court, and the Nicaragua Case, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 3 (1987).
. Observations, supra note 57.
"o Dept. of State Press Release, October 7, 1985, reprinted in 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1744 (1985).
Spring, 1990]
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law to suit its interests. However, when the U.S. explains its position, it should try
to do so in a way and in a forum where it does not have to confront and defy an
institution (the ICJ) whose moral suasion in the field of international law far exceeds
its own.
Strident rhetoric
There is ample reason to believe that some of the things the United States said
and the way it said them exceeded normal bounds of respect for the institution of the
ICJ. Professor Briggs terms U.S. behavior as "showing contempt" for the Court.6'
Professor D'Amato describes the way in which the United States "scornfully repu-
diated the authority of the Court."62 It seems that it is not just U.S. actions, but also
its explanations for those actions that cause concern. Mr. Davis Robinson, Legal
Advisor to the Department of State, in a letter formally announcing U.S. withdrawal
from the case, writes, "the United States is constrained to conclude that the judgment
of the Court was clearly and manifestly erroneous as to both fact and law." 63 In a
letter to the Editor-in-Chief of the American Journal ofInternational Law, Robinson
decries the fact that the case is "an inherently political problem that is not
appropriate for judicial resolution.'"6
Thomas Franck and others told us years ago that the idea of a clear dichotomy
between political and legal disputes is false.65 Nevertheless, the U.S. rediscovered
the issue and, in effect, increased the very politization about which it complained.
Often it seems that the United States has forgotten it is (or was) operating in
a legal forum where one would hope more civility exists. The U.S. impunes the
integrity of the Court judges -- "of the 16 judges now claiming to sit in judgment on
the United States, 11 are from countries that do not accept the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction.' '66 The U.S. did not stop here -- later it singled out specific judges on
the Court:
We will not risk US national security by presenting such sensitive
material in public or before a Court that includes two judges from War-
saw Pact nations. 67
Technically, neither of these U.S. statements is inaccurate, but both are better suited
for other fora. In fact, they sound more like Security Council debates or testimony
61 Briggs, supra note 46, at 86.
62 D'Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 106 (1987).
63 U.S. Withdrawalfrom ProceedingslnitiatedbyNicaragua, 79 AM. J. INrT'L L. 439 (1985) [hereinafter U.S.
Withdrawal].
64 Letter from D. Robinson to AJIL, reprinted in 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 423 (1985).
65 T. Franck, The Structure of Impartiality 190-91 (1968).
61 U.S. Withdrawal, supra note 63, at 440.
67 Id.
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before Congressional Committees.
"GLANCING BLOWS" -- OTHER ACTIVITIES DURING THE REAGAN YEARS
It has already been noted that the Nicaraguan Case was perhaps the most direct
confrontation between the Reagan administration and international law. The
importance of the case stems at once from the salience of the issues; the legal stature
of the International Court of Justice; and the length and specificity of the proceed-
ings. But there were other occasions when the Reagan administration paid inade-
quate attention to international legal principles. Several of these will be discussed
briefly.
Invasion of Grenada
Grenada, a small state some 1,600 miles from the United States, gained its
independence from the United Kingdom in 1974. In October 1983, a coup and
countercoup led the United States to perceive a grave danger to 1,100 U.S. nationals
living in Grenada.68 On October 23, 1983, the U.S. along with Jamaica, Barbados,
Dominica, St. Lucia, Antigua, and St. Vincent invaded and secured the island within
one week's time.69 A great deal has been written about the legality of this action.
70
The official U.S. explanation dealt relatively little with the legal aspects of the
decision to invade. President Reagan's remarks of October 25, 1983 included the
following:
On Sunday, October 23, the United States received an urgent, formal
request from the five member nations of OECS to assist in a joint effort
to restore order and democracy on the island of Grenada.... We have
taken this decisive action for three reasons: First, and of overriding
importance, to protect innocent lives, including up to 1,000 Americans,
whose personal safety is of course my paramount concern. Second, to
forestall further chaos. And third, to assist in restoration of conditions
of law and order and of governmental institutions on the Island of Gre-
nada.7'
Subsequently, Secretary of State Schultz, at a news conference, reiterated the
rationale behind the decision. He cited the need to protect American citizens and the
fact that the United States had received "an urgent request from the countries closest
to the area. "72
68 Joyner, Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 132 (1984).
69 Id.
70 See particularly The United States Action in Grenada, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131-75 (1984) [hereinafter U.S.
Action].
71 83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 67 (Dec., 1983).
72 Id. at 69.
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The international legal academic community came down firmly against the
legality of the invasion. In a note prepared fortheAmericanJournaloflnternational
Law, nine law professors said inter alia:
Throughout the 20th century, the U.S. Government has routinely
concocted evanescent threats to the lives and property of U.S. nationals
as pretexts to justify armed interventions into sister American states....
Both the OAS and UN Charters unequivocally condemn the U.S.
invasion of Grenada as a gross violation of the most fundamental prin-
ciples of international law... International law- lessness in Grenada will
return to haunt the future of American foreign policy around the world.73
Although distinctly a minority viewpoint, Professor John Norton Moore
justified the legality of the invasion. Moore points out that the OECS regional
peacekeeping force "was undertaken at the request of the Governor-General of
Grenada acting at that time as its only constitutional representative." '74 Subse-
quently, Professor Moore defends the action on grounds of humanitarian interven-
tion,75 and even goes so far as to state that "[t]he Grenada mission by the OECS
countries and Barbados, Jamaica and the United States is a paradigm of a lawful
regional peacekeeping action under Article 52.' '76
The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
One could argue that it is misleading to assess proper consideration of
international law in crisis situations. If armed conflict is imminent, the law probably
has already failed. The negotiations and subsequent U.S. attitude towards the 1982
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea77 provide an excellent example of the Reagan
administration's approach to international law in an important area, but definitely at
the sub-crisis level.
At present the 1982 Convention has 42 parties,78 considerably short of the 60
necessary for entry into force.79 All told, the treaty achieved 157 signatures, one of
the most heavily subscribed in history.8° But the U.S. remains one of the few states
that has not signed. 8' No one would question the right of the United States to
"' U.S. Action, supra note 70, at 174. The following signed: Francis Boyle, Abram Chayes, Isaak Dore,
Richard Falk, Martin Feinrider, C. Clyde Ferguson, J. David Fine, Keith Nunes, Burns Weston.
74 Moore, Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 153 (1984).
I ld. at 154.
76 Id. at 156.
" UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, done 10Dec. 1982, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in2l INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1261-1354 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 Convention].
7 Current information kindly provided by the Treaty Section, UN Office of Legal Affairs.
7 1982 Convention, supra note 77, art. 308, at 1327.
80 Gamble, Status of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 MARINE POL'Y REP. 2 (1988).
8] Id.
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associate itself with whatever treaties it chooses. Of course, that ignores the wisdom
of a decision to negotiate for over a decade with more than 150 other countries and
then to withdraw at the eleventh hour. The U.S. policy may have been unwise, but
it was not illegal.
Since the signing of the 1982 Convention, the United States has been at
loggerheads with most of the world, especially the developing countries. The U.S.
believes that it may follow those portions of the treaty that reflect customary
international law, while ignoring other provisions, presumably not reflective of
custom, with which it disagrees.82 Most of the problems the United States has with
the treaty concern the provisions for the "Area," the seabed beyond national juris-
diction." The U.S. position holds that:
Deep seabed mining is a lawful use of the high seas which any state has
a right to carry out subject to reasonable regard to the interests of other
states. The United States continues to enjoy the right to carry out seabed
mining. This right will not be affected by the U.S. decision not to sign
the LOS convention.84
Most of those who participated in the negotiations totally rejected the U.S.
"pick and choose" approach. One of the more forceful reactions to the U.S. position
was made by Ambassador Tommy T.B. Koh (Singapore), President of the Confer-
ence that produced the 1982 treaty:
The argument that, except for Part XI, the Convention codifies custom-
ary law or reflects existing international practice is factually incorrect
and legally insupportable. The regime of transit practice through straits
used for international navigation and the regime of archipelagic sea
lanes passage are two examples of many new concepts in the Conven-
tion. . . . Many are of the view that article 137 (seabed mining
provisions) of the Convention has become as much a part of customary
international law as the freedom of navigation.8 5
The U.S. position received very limited support from others, e.g., the United King-
dom,86 but the general perception was that the U.S. was exhibiting callous, self-
serving disrespect for law, i.e., following international law, or even hiding behind it,
when the situation suited, and ignoring the law otherwise. While this action may not
be in the same category with mining of Nicaraguan harbors, it seems symptomatic
of a deliberate disregard of international law.
82 Gamble & Frankowska, The 1982 Convention and the Customary Law of the Sea: Observations, a
Framework, and a Warning, 21 SAN DIEGO L.R. 491, 504 (1984).
83 1982 Convention, supra note 77, pt. XI, art. 133-91, at 1293-1308.
4 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Press Release, 163, Dec. 3,1982 (statement by Ambassador Adelman).
85 UN Dept. of Public Information, Press Release, SEA/MD/14, at 2 (10 Dec. 1982) (T.T.B. Koh).
8 UN Doc. A/CONF.62/PV.189, at 78-81 (1983) (Statement by Powell-Jones, Head of UK Delegation).
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The Issue of UN Financing
The Reagan administration, often at the urging of the Congress, has failed to
meet its entire financial obligation to the United Nations. The United States has used
three distinct kinds of cuts:
(1) specific (or surgical) cuts aimed at particular programs;
(2) contingent withholdings that will only take effect if certain circum-
stances develop; and
(3) nonspecific, noncontingent across-the-board cuts (the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings withholdings).87
This is one of those areas where one may agree with the motivation and the
goals involved. For example, the "Kassebaum amendment," requiring a reduction
in the total amount of U.S. contribution from one quarter to one fifth, must have
struck many as appropriate.88 But the source and nature of U.S. legal obligation
could hardly be clearer. Article 17 of the UN Charter states that the General
Assembly "shall consider and approve the budget" and dues will be "apportioned
by the General Assembly." Thus it is clear that the U.S. is, or at least was, in
violation of a treaty obligation, the same obligation that in past decades the U.S.
demanded others meet!
There are at least two mitigating factors that make this a less substantial issue
from the point of view of a violation of international law by the Reagan administra-
tion. First, often it was the Congress that took the most strident position against full
payment of U.S. assessment. In fact, AmbassadorWalters suggested in 1986 that our
actions might violate Article 17.89 Second, on September 14, 1988, President
Reagan announced that the U.S. intended to pay all its UN assessments. 90 While the
President's statement represents an important step towards conformity with our
Charter obligations, it did not resolve when and how total obligations of more than
$500,000,000 will be met.9' On balance, this "pay if pleased" tactic shows consid-
erable disregard for international law.
CONCLUSIONS -- REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AC71ONS IN PERSPECTIVE:
BLATANT DISREGARD OR BUSINESS As USUAL
It is at once important and risky to assess the record of the Reagan administra-
87 Nelson, International Law and U.S. Withholding of Payments of International Organizations, 80 AM. J.
INT'L L. 973 (1986).
88 Id. at 974.
89 Id. at 973.
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tion viz international law. Especially with the Nicaragua case, academics seem like
pilots rushing to the site of a plane crash. We have keen interest in the crash, but in
our hearts we know there was a great deal of damage and the flight should never have
occurred. I have already discussed at some length the legal and tactical errors of the
United States when it confronted Nicaragua before the International Court of Justice.
John Lawrence Hargrove, Executive Vice President of the American Society of
International Law, explained how the Court, itself, compounded the problem:
Thus, in its zeal to meet the exigencies of the Nicaragua case, the Court
gratuitously cut off the already beleaguered law of force and self-
defense from whatever clarity and stability go with the written word of
the Charter and the body of treaty law that supports it. . . . The
cumulative effect of all the foregoing is that the law of force and self-
defense as it emerges from the Court has become highly arbitrary,
intricate and technical, but at the same time more uncertain. At the
hands of the Court, it has been made to read, in form and logic, more like
a somewhat erratically drafted revenue code than a set of great consti-
tutional principles.92
The long-term implications of these cases are likely to be substantial. The
United States got caught in a precarious situation that, with a little forethought, could
have been avoided. The result is diminished international legal stature for the United
States and for the International Court of Justice, and, perhaps, less certain law in the
vital area of aggression and self defense.
International law relates to foreign policy in approximately the same way that
antiseptics relate to surgery. International law can and should be part of most foreign
policy decisions. However, situations will arise when it is impossible to pay
adequate attention to that law. The patient may still survive and prosper, but
recovery will be longer and more difficult. Nicaragua v. the United States is an
instance where the U.S. had two proven antiseptics available and, whether through
inattention, na'ivet6 or arrogance, used neither. Comparable conclusions could be
drawn about Grenada and funding for the United Nations.
I suspect that if one surveyed international law scholars and asked about the
Reagan record in international law, most would think it one of the worst of any
president. At this writing, that administration has been in office for only one and one
half years, far too soon for perspective. Further, given the concomitant changes in
international law and in the power and scope of the American presidency, are com-
parisons meaningful? Can we compare Reagan to Wilson, let alone to Jefferson?
The unsatisfactory answer to this question is that comparisons are very difficult, but
are so important that they must be attempted.
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Recent research by Professor John Raymond and Ms. Barbara Frischholz
provides a wealth of information helpful in discerning a context to the relationship
between presidents and international law.93 One of their principal conclusions is that
secretaries of state have borne the primary responsibility "both for the negotiation
of treaties and for the development of policies and practices in the field of customary
international law." 94 One of the clearest examples presented is President Washing-
ton's policy of neutrality in the war between Britain and France. The Neutrality Act
of 1794 was "based on Jefferson's concept of the international law on the subject.' ',9
This raises the disquieting possibility that presidential actions towards inter-
national law may be set largely by their choice for secretary of state. Since it is
unrealistic to assume that background in international law is among the top selection
criteria used by the president, it may be little more than luck if a given secretary is
attuned to the subtleties of international law or seems oblivious to the law.
One gets two main impressions about the period surveyed by Raymond and
Frischholz. First, the United States proceeded cautiously when dealing with
international law when needed to aid in the resolution of particular problems.
Secretary of State Daniel Webster, in 1837, in response to the Caroline incident,
developed the act of state doctrine.96 Immediately after the Civil War, the State
Department had to ascertain "the effect, if any, to be given to official acts of an
unrecognized government taken within its own borders." 9 7 The second impression
is that, in the 19th century, the U.S. often was willing to forego short-term
expedience for longer-run (and usually more consonant with international law)
objectives. An excellent example here is Schooner Exchange v. McFadden.9 8
Marshall's opinion that the French vessel was exempt from U.S. jurisdiction shows
respect for, and sensitivity to, international law.99 Even given the temporal leap of
one and three quarters centuries, it seems that U.S. actions in the Nicaraguan Case
do not demonstrate a comparably positive view of international law.
If pushed to draw comparisons between early U.S. presidents and Ronald
Reagan, the least risky comparison is with Thomas Jefferson. Because Jefferson
served long and in many important capacities, there are simply more grounds for
comparison. Jefferson's extraordinary intellect made many significant contribu-
tions to international law. He believed that the "law of nations is composed of...
the moral law of our nature, the usages of nations, (and) their special conven-
tions. " 00 Sometimes, Jefferson seems to have been a century or more ahead of his
" Raymond & Brischholz, Lawyers Who Established International Law in the United States, 1776-1914,76
Am. J. Int'l L. 802-29 (1982) [hereinafter Lawyers].
94 Id. at 805.
95 Id. at 806.
96 Id. at 808.
97 Id. at 819.
9' 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
99 Lawyers, supra note 93, at 804.
" Wiltse, Thomas Jefferson and the Law of Nations, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 66-81 (1935).
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time. In 1793, he wrote that extradition can be affected only by treaty, there is no
customary law on the subject.' 0 A year earlier, Jefferson analyzed the distinctions
between defacto and de jure recognition.0 2 Secretary of State Jefferson handled this
complicated issue more deftly than Presidents Wilson, Harding, Coolidge, Hoover,
Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson did when confronted with the realities
of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.
However, the picture emerging of Thomas Jefferson and international law is
not all positive. Jefferson developed a theory to justify American expansion into
uninhabited territories, but then changed that theory to justify, ex post facto, taking
lands from the Indians.10 3 In an 1807 letter, Jefferson explained territorial expansion.
If we claim that country at all, it must be on Astor's settlement near the
mouth of the Columbia, and the principle of thejus gentium of America,
that when a civilized nation takes possession of the mouth of a river in
a new country, that possession is considered as including all its wa-
ters.tO4
It is tempting to speculate how international legal academics, if any had existed in
1807, would have dealt with wider applicability of the "Jefferson principle." The
point is that Jefferson's statements and actions often displayed less than reverence
for international law.
These brief remarks do not constitute a thorough analysis of whether the
Reagan administration exceeded the usual limits set by international law. Books
could be written, and perhaps will be, comparing the Reagan record with more recent
history, e.g., Presidents Johnson and Nixon and Viet Nam. No doubt there is a
tendency for academics to play their time-honored role as critic, not appreciating the
problems of managing relations with 160 other states. These criticisms of the
Reagan administration should not be written off as mere potshots from ivory towers.
We should not have expected President Reagan to begin important foreign policy
addresses by quoting the UN Charter (or the ICJ Statute). But Mr. Reagan's
pronouncements are almost completely devoid of any mention of international law.
Other post-war presidents spoke much more about international law. The 1984 State
of the Union Address is typical. There are vague references to building a "mean-
ingful peace .... to protect our loved ones and this shining star of faith." 05 The
President discussed American exploration for resources within our 200-mile Exclu-
sive Economic Zone' °6 with absolutely no mention of the fact that the 1982 UN Con-
101 Id. at 72.
102 Id. at 73.
103 Id. at 70.
104 Official Papers of Thomas Jefferson, letter of July 4, 1807 (sic), reprinted in Wiltse, supra note 100, at
69.
105 State of the Union, Jan. 25, 1984, 50 VrrAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY at 259 (1984).
106 Id. at 260.
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vention on the Law of the Sea, which he campaigned against, hammered out the
details that made such zones possible. In discussing Grenada, the president said not
one word about the legality of the operation. Instead he played on the emotions of
the audience by relating a story about a sergeant in the 2nd Ranger Battalion. 107
Secretary Schultz's decision of November, 1988 to deny a visa to PLO Chair-
man Arafat continued this attitude towards international law. Mr. Schultz's expla-
nation was that Arafat "knows of, condones and lends support to" terrorism. 08 One
is hard pressed to find a clearer treaty violation, in this case the 1947 UN
Headquarters Agreement.
The federal, state or local authorities of the United States shall not
impose any impediments to transit to or from the headquarters district
of representatives of members or officials of the United Nations, or of
specialized agencies or representatives of nongovernmental organiza-
tions recognized by the United Nations for the purpose of consultation.
... (Section 13) ... When visas are required ... they shall be granted
without charge and as promptly as possible. 0 9
The obvious conclusion is that, while the Reagan administration may not be
"off the chart," it probably falls at the low end of the continuum in terms of respect
for, and attention to, international law. The Reagan years were characterized by a
systemic self righteousness, an attitude that seems to say "we know we are right, just
and peaceloving, so don't complicate matters with reference to minutiae of interna-
tional law." That approach ignores the fact that we must co-exist with 165 other
states, most of whom are unwilling a priori to concede the moral high ground to the
United States.
107 Id. at 261.
101 Pear, U.S. Won't Oppose Geneva Session, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1988, at A3, col. 4.
09 What the Host Must Not Do, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1988, at A3, col. 3.
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